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University Students' Right to Retain Counsel for
Disciplinary Proceedings
MARK S. BLASKEY*
INTRODUCTION
University and college students today take much pride in their
education because of the hard work, time, and money that goes
into obtaining a degree. This investment of time and money gives
students more than just a passing stake; it creates an "interest" in
their education. Courts have recognized that this interest cannot
be taken away without due process of law.1
Imagine a university student, having spent sixteen years of his
life in school, being expelled just prior to graduation for discipli-
nary reasons without being given the opportunity to present his
side of the story. Twelve years ago, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that this expulsion cannot occur without first
giving the student a chance to present his case before the
university.'
But just how beneficial is a hearing if the student stands alone
against the forces of a long-established institution? A student ap-
pearing before a university disciplinary board needs the guidance
and assistance of a trained attorney. The student's interest can
only be protected if the student is represented at the hearing by an
attorney. Without professional assistance, the student could easily
be brushed aside by the bureaucracy, never to be heard from
again.
The case which supports this proposition regarding the amount
of process due a student at a disciplinary hearing is Main v. Uni-
versity of Puerto Rico.- Marin requires that at a minimum, a uni-
versity student being disciplined has the right to obtain and be
represented by an attorney at the hearing.4
Currently, courts are divided on whether to allow students to
obtain an attorney for disciplinary hearings. Three basic ap-
* B.A. University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 1985; J.D. California Western School of
Law, 1987.
1. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
2. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
3. 377 F. Supp. 613 (1974).
4. Id. at 623-24.
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proaches are now being used: 1) allow an attorney to appear at
the hearing, but only in an advisory capacity;5 2) allow an attor-
ney to participate and represent the student at the hearing; and 3)
refuse to allow an attorney to appear at all.6 The courts are in a
state of disarray on this issue with each jurisdiction creating its
own rules.
The majority of cases in this area hold that students at discipli-
nary hearings have no absolute right to have an attorney present
their case.7 In Nash v. Auburn University,8 students attending
Auburn University's College of Veterinary Medicine were charged
with "academic dishonesty."9 At their disciplinary hearing, the
students were allowed to bring counsel, but he was not allowed to
participate directly in the proceeding. Instead, counsel was limited
to a purely advisory role.'0 On appeal, the district court found no
circumstances to warrant a departure from what it called the ma-
jority position of limiting counsel's role in such proceedings to that
of an advisor." Nash is a step in the right direction in that it
allows a student to bring an attorney with him to his disciplinary
hearing. However, Nash does not go far enough since limiting the
attorney to the role of advisor is of little help to students.
The student in Hart v. Ferris State College'2 was charged with
off-campus violations of the college's "Misconduct and Discipline
Policy and Procedures."' As in Nash, the student was allowed to
5. See, e.g., Marzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562, 567 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Es-
teban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
6. See, e.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Madera v. Board
of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W.V.
1968); General Order on Judicial Standards, 45 F.R.D. 133, 147-48.
7. Nash v. Auburn Univ., 621 F. Supp. 948, 957 (D.C. Ala. 1985).
8. Id. at 948.
9. Id. at 948. Some of the students were charged with giving assistance during an
examination, while other students were charged with receiving this assistance by communi-
cation from the other students. The specific charge in part was, "giving or receiving assis-
tance or communications . . . during the anatomy examination on or about May 16,
1985." Id. at 951.
10. Id. at 952. During the hearing, the students presented opening statements, re-
butted the witnesses against them, presented their own witnesses in defense, and responded
to the Board members' questions (the same basic elements of a criminal trial). Yet the
attorney obtained by the students to help them was limited to merely giving advice to the
students. The attorney was not permitted to participate directly in the proceedings. Id.
I1. Id. at 957-58. The court even went so far as to state that the students were
afforded more, not less, than the constitution requires. The court implied that even if the
students were denied counsel altogether they would still have no due process claim. Id.
12. 557 F. Supp. 1379 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
13. Id. at 1380. The full text of the provision was as follows:
MISCONDucT. The following categories of misconduct may arise in the student's rela-
tionship as a member of the college community. Enumeration of specific offenses within a
category is illustrative, not restrictive. Included also are aiders and abettors, as well as
those individuals who threaten or attempt to commit offenses.
OFF-CANIPUS VIOLATIONS. Further disciplinary or restricting action may be taken when
2
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bring an attorney to the disciplinary proceeding, but the attorney
was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses on behalf of the stu-
dent. The student appealed, claiming that the college deprived her
of her right to "a hearing at which plaintiff receives the effective
assistance of counsel, including the right to examine witnesses and
taken an active role in the proceedings."14 On appeal, the court
determined that due process provided only that a student have an
attorney present for advice and consultation, not that the attorney
could question witnesses for the student. 5
Jaska v. Regents of the University of Michigan" explains why
some courts believe students do not have a constitutional right to
have an attorney participate in their disciplinary hearings. In
Jaska, at a hearing in which he was not represented by counsel, a
student was suspended from the university for cheating on an ex-
amination.17 The student appealed claiming at least the right to a
student lawyer. The court, however, listed three reasons why the
student was not denied due process. First, the court determined
that the proceedings against the student were not unduly com-
plex.18 Second, the court found it significant that the university
did not proceed against the student through an attorney.' 9 Finally,
the court determined that the student was able to present his case
effectively to the Academic Judiciary and therefore suffered no
disadvantage due to the lack of representation.20
The purpose of this article is to propose that the standards of
the student is on property other than the college campus and when the individual is: (a)
obstructing or interfering with the activities of the college; (b) claiming to represent or act
in behalf of the college when not authorized to so represent or to so act; (c) in violation of
federal, state, or local laws, which materially and adversely affects the individual's suitabil-
ity as a member of the college community. Id. at 1380 n.1.
14. Id. at 1381. This was one of five procedural due process claims appealed by the
student. Another included the right to "a hearing at which plaintiff will have an opportu-
nity to confront her accusers and examine their testimony, with the assistance of counsel."
Id.
15. Id. at 1387-88. The court felt that under the guidance of her attorney, the stu-
dent could probably make whatever points through the questioning of witnesses that her
attorney could; it would just be done in a less efficient manner. Id.
16. 597 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
17. Id. at 1247. A professor received an anonymous telephone call from a student
who said he saw plaintiff switch exam cover sheets, and submit his cover sheet with a
classmate's statistics exam. Id.
18. Id. at 1252. The court felt that the Manual of Procedures for the Academic
Judiciary, which was written in plain English, was sufficient to guide the student through
the Academic Judiciary proceedings. Additionally, the court felt that the student was help-
fully guided by his two visits to the dean's office to ask questions about the proceedings. Id.
19. Id. The University's case was presented by Professor Rothman, the statistics
teacher whose exam the student was accused of cheating on. Id. The court did not address
the level of education Professor Rothman had completed, nor did the court explain how
much training and experience Professor Rothman had in Academic Judiciary proceeding.
20. Id.
3
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due process set forth in Marin be adopted nationwide. This would
give all public university or college students who appear before a
disciplinary board or committee the right to obtain and be repre-
sented by legal counsel. First, this article briefly examines the dif-
ferences between educational disciplinary hearings and academic
hearings. Second, it presents the history of disciplinary hearings
and the requirement of due process. Third, it explores the two fun-
damental interests a student has in his education: property and
liberty. Finally, once it can be established that a university stu-
dent has a substantial interest in his education, this article looks
at what due process rights must be afforded the student before
that interest in his education may be taken away.
I. DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS VERSUS ACADEMIC HEARINGS
The difference between a disciplinary hearing and an academic
hearing focuses on the charges against the student. While the for-
mer deals with student misconduct, the latter deals with a stu-
dent's failure to attain minimum standards of academic excel-
lence.21 The Supreme Court first recognized a difference between
disciplinary and academic hearings in 1978 in Board of Curators
of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz.2" Horowitz indicates
that the degree of due process to which a student is entitled de-
pends on the characterization of the dismissal as either "aca-
demic" or "disciplinary."28 The case dealt with a medical student
being expelled from school because of her poor "academic
performance."24
The Supreme Court, however, is often criticized for its classifi-
cation of Horowitz as an academic dismissal.2 5 The school dis-
missed the student for, among other things, erratic attendance at
clinical sessions and her lack of critical concern for personal hy-
giene.26 These were not viewed by the court as misconduct, but
rather as important factors in the school's determination of
whether a student would make a good medical doctor.2 7 Mr. Jus-
21. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 87 (1978).
22. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
23. Comment, Due Process Rights of Students: Limitations on Goss v. Lopez - A
Retreat out of the "Thicket," 9 J.L. & E. 449, 451 (1980).
24. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 91 n.6. The Court stated that "[tihe record leaves no
doubt that respondent was dismissed for purely academic reasons." Id.
25. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 23.
26. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 81.
27. Id. at 91 n.6. The Court noted, "[q]uestions of personal hygiene and timeliness,
of course, may seem more analogous to traditional fact-finding than other inquiries that a
school may make in academically evaluating a student. But in so evaluating the student,
the school considers and weighs a variety of factors, not all of which, as noted earlier, are
adaptable to the fact-finding hearing." Id.
[Vol. 24
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tice Marshall dissented on this point explaining that in the min-
utes of the meeting at which it was first decided that the student
should not graduate, it was said that "this issue is not one of aca-
demic achievement, but of performance. ' 28 The dissent continued
that the relevant point was that the student was dismissed largely
because of her conduct.29
The distinction between academic hearings and disciplinary
hearings is an important one. The Supreme Court in Horowitz
adopted the view established by lower courts that formal hearings
need not be held in cases of academic dismissals.3" The Court
noted on the other hand, however, that disciplinary hearings suffi-
ciently resemble traditional judicial and administrative fact-find-
ing processes to require a hearing."1
When disciplinary hearings first arose in the 1920s, both the
state and federal courts recognized that there were distinct differ-
ences between decisions to suspend or dismiss a student for disci-
plinary purposes and similar actions taken for academic reasons.
Hearings were used in the former case but not the latter.32 Courts
reasoned that dismissal for academic reasons called for far less
stringent procedural requirements33 because determining whether
a student has fallen below the standard of excellence in his studies
is an easier task than determining misconduct.34
Disciplinary proceedings are by their very nature more complex
because they involve adjudicating offenses which might be deemed
"criminal." The university brings charges against the student, wit-
28. Id. at 103 (emphasis in original). The minutes quoted by Justice Marshall read:
"This issue is not one of academic achievement, but of performance, relationship to people
and ability to communicate." Id.
29. Id. at 104. Justice Marshall commented that only one of the reasons voiced by
the school for deciding not to graduate the student had any arguable nonconduct aspects,
and that reason, "clinical competence," was plainly related to perceived deficiencies in the
student's personal hygiene and relationships with colleagues and patients. Id. at n.17.
30. Id. at 87-88.
31. Id. at 88-89. Two reasons noted by the Court for this conclusion are: 1) for a
period of over 60 years, state and federal courts unanimously held that formal hearings
before decision-making bodies need not be held in the case of academic dismissals, and 2) a
school is an academic institution, not a courtroom or administrative hearing room. Id.
32. Id. at 87. The Court stated that "[a] public hearing may be regarded as helpful
to the ascertainment of misconduct and useless or harmful in finding out the truth as to
scholarship." See also Barnard v. Inhabitants of Sheburne, 216 Mass. 19, 22-23, 102 N.E.
1095, 1097 (1913).
33. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 86. In recognizing this, the Court concluded that after
"considering all relevant factors, including the evaluative nature of the inquiry and the
insignificant and historically supported interest of the school in preserving its present
framework for academic evaluations, a hearing is not required by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 86 n.3.
34. Id. at 87. The determination of whether a student's grades are up to standards
is a relatively simple matter. Requiring that a student be able to retain an attorney for a
"criminal" hearing might well interfere with the university process.
1988]
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nesses are called to support the charges, and the student generally
is given an opportunity to present a defense.35 Since the discipli-
nary process is complex, the student is likely to be intimidated
because of his youth and lack of skills in an adjudicatory proceed-
ing. In this type of hearing, a student needs the guidance, help,
and expertise of a professional litigator to protect his interests.
II. HISTORY
Courts have unanimously held that a student being suspended
or expelled for disciplinary reasons is entitled to due process of
law.30 Once it was determined that due process applied, the ques-
tion remained of what process are students due? 7
The standards adopted for due process in disciplinary hearings
were established in the landmark case of Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education.38 At Alabama State College, there was an
organization responsible for civil rights demonstrations. The or-
ganization was led by twenty-nine Negro students.39 The organi-
zation participated in several demonstrations, the most important
of which occurred when several Negro students went to a court-
house and asked to be served at the white lunch counter, then a
violation of Alabama state law.40 These demonstrations resulted in
the expulsion of nine students and the suspension of 20 others.41
Each of the nine expelled students received notice of their expul-
sion after the school had decided the students could no longer at-
tend.4 2 None of the students were afforded the opportunity to re-
35. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1975).
36. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961);
Goss, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
37. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
38. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
39. Id. at 154. Investigation into the conduct of the organization was made by Dr.
Trenholm, as President of the Alabama State College, the Director of Public Safety for the
State of Alabama under the directions of the Governor, and by the investigative staff of the
Attorney General for the State of Alabama. Their reports on the civil rights organization
led to the identification of the students responsible for the demonstration.
40. Id. at 152-53. The district court found that on February 25, 1960, "approxi-
mately twenty-nine Negro students, including these six plaintiffs, according to a prear-
ranged plan, entered as a group a publicly owned lunch grill located in the basement of the
county courthouse in Montgomery, Alabama, and asked to be served. Service was refused;
the lunchroom was closed; the Negroes refused to leave; police authorities were summoned;
and the Negroes were ordered outside where they remained in the corridor of the court-
house for approximately one hour." Id. at 152-53 n.3.
41. Id. at 154. No formal charges were made against the students.
42. Id. The students received a letter from the Alabama State College, signed by
President H. Councill Trenholm, which read in part:
"Dear Sir: This communication is the official notification of your expulsion from Alabama
State College as of the end of the 1960 Winter Quarter." Id. at 154 n.2.
[Vol. 24
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but any charges against them at a hearing.4"
On appeal, the court of appeals established that, "[W]henever a
governmental body acts so as to injure an individual, the constitu-
tion requires that the act be consonant with due process of law.
The minimum procedural requirements necessary to satisfy due
process depend upon the circumstances and the interests of the
parties involved."" The court held that due process in this context
requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing before a student
is expelled for misconduct.4 5
This same view was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1975 in
Goss v. Lopez.4" Goss dealt with six high school students who
were each suspended for ten days because of disruptive or disobe-
dient conduct. 47 None of the students were given a hearing to de-
termine the operative facts underlying their suspension.48 Al-
though Goss dealt with the suspension of high school students for
misconduct, the Supreme Court explained that at the very mini-
mum, students facing suspension and consequent interference with
a protected property interest49 must be given some kind of notice
and afforded some kind of hearing prior to suspension or
expulsion. 50
43. Id. at 154. Plaintiff Dixon testified:
"Q. Did the president or any other person at the college arrange for any type of hearing
where you had an opportunity to present your side prior to the time you were expelled? A.
No."
The testimony of Governor Patterson, Chairman of the State Board of Education,
included:
"Q. Were these students given any type of hearing, or were formal charges filed against
them before they were expelled? A. They were - Dr. Trenholm expelled the students; they
weren't given any hearing." Id. at 154-55 n.4.
44. Id. at 155.
45. Id. at 158. See also Comment, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process", 70
HARV. L. REV. 1406 (1957).
The nature of the hearing, however, according to the court should vary depending upon
the circumstances of the particular case. The court determined that this case requires
"something more than an informal interview with an administrative authority of the col-
lege." Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158.
46. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
47. Id. at 569. One of the students was among a group of students demonstrating in
the school auditorium while a class was being conducted there. He was ordered by the
school principal to leave and when he refused to do so he was suspended.
Another student physically attacked a police officer in the presence of the principal. Four
other students were suspended for similar conduct. Id.
48. Id. at 570. The students were afforded the opportunity to attend a conference,
together with their parents, subsequent to the effective date of their suspension to discuss
the students' future. Id.
No testimony was given as to what would happen to the students if they did not attend
this conference.
49. A university student's property interest will be examined later in this article.
See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
50. Goss, 419 U.S. at 579 (emphasis in original). Parties whose rights are affected
are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be
1988]
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Three years after Goss, in Horowitz, the Supreme Court once
again stressed the importance of due process in disciplinary pro-
ceedings. Although Horowitz involved an academic hearing, the
Court nevertheless noted that a "student at a tax-supported insti-
tution cannot be arbitrarily disciplined without the benefit of the
ordinary, well-recognized principles of fair play."51
Today, Dixon, Goss, and Horowitz form the foundation which
requires procedural due process at disciplinary hearings for stu-
dents. However, each of these cases failed to establish any re-
quirements beyond adequate notice and a hearing. This left lower
courts to determine what other, if any, due process requirements
are fundamentally due students at disciplinary hearings. Specifi-
cally, the issue arises whether a student has the right to retain
counsel52 and have that experienced attorney speak on behalf of
the student and represent him at his disciplinary hearing.
III. UNIVERSITY STUDENTS' "INTEREST" IN HIGHER
EDUCATION
53
As noted earlier, the amount of procedural requirements neces-
sary to satisfy due process depends on the interests of the parties
involved.54 The stronger the interest a student has in his educa-
tion, the stronger the need becomes for procedural requirements to
protect that interest. University students have two major interests
in their education; property and liberty.
A. Property Interest
The fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution forbids
states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law.5 High school students, like those in Goss,
have little problem invoking the fourteenth amendment's due pro-
cess safeguards since all but one of the states 6 have compulsory
education laws.57 These laws, however, do not apply to higher edu-
notified. Id.
51. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 88 n.4.
52. What the Supreme Court said on the issue of students' rights to retain counsel
at disciplinary proceedings in Goss and Horowitz is examined later in this article.
53. This article only examines a public university student's interest in his education
because it is a well-settled rule that the relationship between a student and a private uni-
versity is a matter of contract. See Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 N.Y. App. Div. 487,
231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928).
54. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
55. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
56. See Comment, supra note 23, at 458. Mississippi has no compulsory education
statute. See generally Comment, Students Rights and Due Process: Procedural Require-
ments of Goss v. Lopez, 46 Miss. L.J. 1041, 1046 (1975).
57. The Supreme Court recognized that the state is constrained to recognize a stu-
[Vol. 24
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cation. It is often noted, therefore, that "the right to attend a pub-
lic college or university is not in and of itself a constitutional
right."58 Despite this, the district court in Jaksa cited Goss in de-
termining that a university student may have a property interest
in continuing his education. 9 In fact, some courts hold that stu-
dents do have a property interest in higher education. Courts rely
on the fact that states establish public university school systems
for their students and a property interest is recognized by state
law.60 They also rely upon dictum by the Supreme Court in
Horowitz which assumed the existence of a property interest for
university students.6'
In 1985, the Supreme Court once again assumed the existence
of a property interest in a student's higher education in Regents of
the University of Michigan v. Ewing.6 2 In Ewing, a medical stu-
dent was dropped from registration in a medical program when he
failed five of seven subjects on his examination. The Supreme
Court stated that, as in Horowitz, it would "assume the existence
of a constitutionally protectible property right." '64 The Court went
on to hold that such a right entitled the student to continued en-
rollment free from arbitrary dismissal. 5 Thus, some courts seem
to suggest that students have a cognizable property interest in
their higher education within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment.
dent's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which is protected
by the due process clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct without adher-
ence to the minimum procedures required by that clause. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
58. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 950; See also Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293
U.S. 245 (1961).
59. Jaska, 597 F. Supp. at 1247.
60. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 82.
61. In Horowitz, the Court assumed "the existence of a liberty or property interest"
for students in their education and concluded that "respondent has been awarded at least
as much due process as the Fourteenth Amendment requires." Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 84-
85. This language is used by many litigators today in an attempt to establish that a univer-
sity student does have a property interest in his education.
For a contra view (that university students do not have a property interest in their edu-
cation) see Comment, supra note 23.
62. 106 S. Ct. 507 (1985). Although Ewing can be classified as an "academic"
disciplinary case, for the purposes of establishing a property interest in education, the dis-
tinction need not be made.
63. "Id. at 508. The examination is known as "NBME Part I." The student was
dismissed when he failed this examination with the lowest score recorded in the history of
the program. Id. at 507.
64. Id. at 512. The Court noted that under Michigan law, Ewing may have enjoyed
a property right and an interest in his continued enrollment in the medical program. Id. at
512 n.8.
65. Id. at 512. The Court eventually held, however, that Ewing was not arbitrarily
dismissed and that he was afforded the protection required by due process. Id. at 514.
19881
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B. Liberty Interest
Even assuming that a university student has no property inter-
est in his education, it is widely held 6 that university students
hold a strong liberty interest in their education. In Dixon, the
court explained that "[it requires no argument to demonstrate
that education is vital and, indeed, basic to civilized society" to
invoke the liberty interest.68 The court added that the precise na-
ture of the interest involved in disciplinary cases is the right to
remain at a public institution of higher learning where the student
has sufficient grades to otherwise comply with academic stan-
dards.6" The court was concerned with the possibility of arbitrary
action against the students. The court stated that the due process
clause forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty70 such as those that
can occur when a student is suspended from school without first
having a hearing.
Through the years, courts have divided this liberty interest into
two areas: 1) the student's right to an education to obtain an ade-
quate livelihood and 2) the right to further one's education. In
either situation, where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or
integrity is at stake the requirements of the due process clause are
invoked."'
1. Adequate Livelihood-Dixon defined a liberty interest in
education as giving students the possibility to excel in life as a
result of their schooling. 72 An extended suspension or exclusion
from school deprives a student of important liberties. 3 The ration-
ale is that long absences from school threaten the student with
inability to keep up with his classes and that the loss of a year's
work and of incentive threaten the continuation of his educational
career. 74 Without a proper education, the ex-student will find it
66. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574; Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157; Marin v. University of P.R.,
377 F. Supp. 613 (D.C.D.P.R. 1974); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
67. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
68. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157. See also Goss, 419 U.S. at 576 (quoting Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)) ("education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments.").
69. Id. at 157.
70. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
71. Id.; see also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). Addition-
ally, liberty interests include the right to be free from arbitrary and capricious actions. See
generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
72. "Without [a] sufficient education the [students] would not be able to earn an
adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the
duties and responsibilities of good citizens." Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157.
73. Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 208 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
74. Id. at 208. One court noted that "it goes without saying, and needs no elabora-
tion, that a record of expulsion from high school constitutes a lifetime stigma." Vought v.
[Vol. 24
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harder to obtain a good job and attain an adequate livelihood for
himself and his family.
In Horowitz,75 the Court was reluctant to decide whether a stu-
dent has a liberty interest in his education. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist 7 6 commented that it was not necessary to decide that issue.77
However, in his dissent, Justice Marshall noted that when a stu-
dent has devoted years of preparation to an education, the student
should not be deprived of his education without affording him a
high level of protection.78
2. Continuing Education-If a student is expelled from a uni-
versity or college, he probably will not be able to continue his edu-
cation at another university or college. 9 Students have the right
or interest to continue their training at a university of their
choice. 80
To deprive a student of his further education is to deprive him
of a liberty. The term liberty includes the right to engage in any
common occupation of life, to acquire useful knowledge and gen-
erally to enjoy those privileges which are guaranteed to every
person. 81
IV. RIGHT OF STUDENTS TO BE REPRESENTED BY AN
ATTORNEY
Since the Supreme Court assumes that a student has a property
interest in his education82 and since the Supreme Court as well as
other courts recognize a strong liberty interest in a student's edu-
Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1393 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
If the effect of expulsion is that drastic in high school, one can only imagine the lasting
effects a student would have after being expelled from a college or university.
75. Decided by a plurality of the Supreme Court.
76. At the time of this decision Mr. Rehnquist was an Associate Justice.
77. "We need not decide, however, whether respondent's dismissal deprived her of a
liberty interest in pursuing a medical career. Nor need we decide whether respondent's
dismissal infringed any other interest constitutionally protected against deprivation without
procedural due process." Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 84.
78. "As Judge Friendly has written in a related context, when the state seeks 'to
deprive a person of a way of life to which [s]he has devoted years of preparation and on
which [s]he ... ha[s] come to rely,' it should be recognized first to provide a 'high level of
procedural protection.'" Id. at 100. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting "Some Kind of Hearing." 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296-97 (1975)).
79. Marin v. University of P.R. 377 F. Supp. 613, 622 (D.C.D.P.R. 1974).
80. Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 178 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
81. Marin, 377 F. Supp. at 621. The right to engage in a chosen occupation is
meaningless if one is unable to obtain the training it requires. Likewise, the right to acquire
useful knowledge implies a right of access to institutions dispensing such knowledge. Id. at
622.
82. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 84-85; Ewing, 106 S. Ct. at 512.
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cation, 3 this interest cannot be deprived without due process of
law. 84 Once it is determined that due process applies, the question
remains what process is due?"8
Before a university can deprive students of a property or liberty
interest, it must satisfy certain requirements.8 6 A delicate balance
must be achieved between the authority of the university to regu-
late student conduct and the constitutional rights of students.81
Students lose no constitutional rights by virtue of their status as
students.88 However, it is unclear whether the "right" of a student
to obtain counsel to represent him at a disciplinary hearing is a
constitutional right. In a criminal hearing, the student as a de-
fendant would be entitled to counsel.89 As a result of a university's
disciplinary hearing, although the school could not incarcerate a
student, the school could deprive him of a liberty that could affect
his life for years to come.
The liberty lost by the student could be his chance to continue
his education at a university9" or his chance to excel in life as a
result of the schooling. 91 Although the student will not be locked
in a jail, the ramifications of a university's expulsion could drasti-
cally affect the student's present and future.
Moreover, the disciplinary hearing system pits the overreaching
power of a university board with little to lose against the substan-
tial education interest of the student. In this situation fundamen-
tal rules of fair play, fundamental fairness, and due process re-
quire that the student be allowed to obtain an attorney to
represent him.
Matin v. University of Puerto Rico92 fully recognizes this re-
83. See, e.g., Goss, 419 U.S. at 574; Dixon, 294 F. 2d at 157; Marin, 377 F. Supp.
at 621; Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
84. Jaksa, 597 F. Supp. at 1248, stated: "Whether plaintiff's (a university stu-
dent's) interest is a "liberty" interest, "property" interest, or both, it is clear that he is
entitled to the protection of the due process clause."
85. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
86. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 158. The question presented by this article then becomes an
issue, does due process allow a college or university disciplinary board the right to refuse a
student the opportunity to bring an attorney to the disciplinary hearing and have that at-
torney participate?
87. Matin, 377 F. Supp. at 621. This article does not propose to "handcuff" univer-
sities in their regulation of student conduct. Creation and adoption of disciplinary rules are
not an issue being addressed. The problem arises when these rules are applied and enforced
against students. It is only at this time that the student should be entitled to have his
attorney participate in the university's attempt to regulate student conduct.
88. Id. at 620.
89. The right to an attorney attaches only in cases where the accused's punishment
will put him in jail. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
90. Marin, 377 F. Supp. at 621.
91. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 157. Excelling in life includes the opportunity to fulfill as
completely as possible the duties and responsibilities of good citizens.
92. 377 F. Supp. 613 (D.C.D.P.R. 1974).
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quirement. In Marin, full time university students were suspended
for more than one year for incidents which were in violation of the
General Rules and Regulations for the Students of the University
of Puerto Rico.93 These incidents included students opposing the
administration's conduct of a campus election, wrongfully entering
a conference of the dean, distributing leaflets denouncing the cam-
pus election, and picketing the Administrative Building.94
At a hearing before the disciplinary board, the students were
allowed to be represented by counsel and to have the counsel par-
ticipate in the proceeding. 95 At the conclusion of the hearing, the
students brought an action to challenge the university's power to
regulate conduct.
The court first recognized the students' strong liberty interest in
their education9" by noting the opportunity education gives a stu-
dent to obtain an adequate livelihood. The court also recognized
the students' right to further their education.9
The court went on to state that the standards of due process
that must be afforded "depend on the nature of the interests af-
fected and the circumstances of the deprivation." 98 Since the court
recognized a significant student interest in education and the po-
tential loss by suspension, it ruled that the right to obtain and be
represented by counsel was a minimum requirement of due pro-
cess. 99 The court took special measures to explain that its decision
"merely establishes the minimum requirement of due process."100
The court went so far as to state that a student had a right to
93. Id. at 616. The "General Rules and Regulations for the Students of the Univer-
sity of Puerto Rico" is used to regulate the conduct of all the university students. Id.
94. Id. at 618. At the disciplinary hearing, some of the charges were not adequately
proved and were subsequently dropped. Id.
95. Id. It is not known if the charges that were dropped can be directly attributed
to the participation of the attorney. It seems more probable than not that the attorney's
participation played a substantial role in the dismissal of the charges. This further goes to
show the vital importance of having an attorney participate in disciplinary hearings.
96. Id. at 621. "Due process protection is particularly necessary when, as here, the
governmental action may damage the individual's standing in the community, academic or
general, or may impose a stigma or other disability that forecloses his freedom to take
advantage of other educational or future employment opportunities." Id. at 622.
97. Id. at 622. "Suspension from a public college is a mark on one's record that
may well preclude further study at any public and many private institutions and limit the
positions one can qualify for after termination of one's studies." Id.
98. Id. at 622-23. See also Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972); Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 866, 895
(1961).
99. "[N]o sound reason appears why, in light of the individual's significant interest,
these state goals, however important, need be vindicated in the normal case without ...
(2) a full, expedited evidentiary hearing ... (e) with the assistance of retained counsel
." (emphasis added). Marin, 377 F. Supp at 623-24.
100. Id. at 624. The court also noted that its definition of the minimum standards of
procedural due process is not designed as the description of the only salutary standards. Id.
19881
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retain counsel at an informal preliminary hearing.10  The court
recognized the substantial interest a student has in his education
by the time he reaches the university level and ruled he should not
be deprived of that interest without due process of law.
Taking Matin to the opposite end of the educational spectrum,
Givens v. Poe'02 held that two elementary school students who
were expelled from school for disciplinary reasons had the right to
obtain counsel and have that counsel represent them at a discipli-
nary hearing. The court held that if a student could be suspended
from school for a considerable time as a result of a disciplinary
hearing, that student has the right to be represented by counsel at
the hearing. 3 Like Matin, the Givens court, stressed the impor-
tance of procedural due process at disciplinary hearings. The court
stated that "[n]ot all courts have expressly required all the items
listed above,10 4 but all items do appear essential if both the sub-
stance and the appearance of fairness are to be preserved." 0
Givens states that the right to obtain counsel is a protection ele-
mentary students must have to preserve their due process. If an
elementary school student who has one to five years of education
to preserve has the right to counsel, certainly a university student
with twelve to twenty years of education at stake should similarly
be afforded such right at disciplinary hearings. a06 Marin recog-
101. Id. at 623-24. If due process allows a student to have his attorney participate in
an informal hearing, then constitutionally, due process should allow a student to have his
attorney participate in any type of formal hearing regarding the student's rights.
102. 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
103. "[W]here expulsion or suspension for any considerable period of time is a possi-
ble consequence of proceedings, modern courts have held that due process requires a num-
ber of procedural safeguards such as: "(5) the right to be represented by counsel (though
not at public expense)." Id. at 209.
104. The items referred to by the court were:
"(1) notice to parents and student in the form of a written and specific statement of the
charges which, if proved, would justify the punishment sought; (2) a full hearing after
adequate notice and (3) conducted by an impartial tribunal; (4) the right to examine ex-
hibits and other evidence against the student; (5) the right to be represented by counsel
(though not at public expense); (6) the right to confront and examine witnesses; (7) the
right to present evidence on behalf of the student; (8) the right to make a record of the
proceedings; and (9) the requirement that the decision of the authorities be based upon
substantial evidence." Id.
105. Id. "In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarian-
ism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in
school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their
obligations to the State." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 511 (1969).
106. As previously noted, once a university student is expelled from school his
chances of continuing on at another institution are slim. An elementary school student, by
contrast, probably won't have to face the same threatening reality. Elementary school stu-
dents have a state protected interest in their education. The state would not likely prevent a
student from going to school for his entire life. It is also much easier for an elementary
14
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nizes the fundamental right to counsel for students at disciplinary
hearings. However, it represents a minority position among the
courts today.
Since the Supreme Court in Goss refused to decide whether stu-
dents have the right to have attorneys speak for them at discipli-
nary hearings,10 7 lower courts have been able to adopt their own
rulings on this issue. Most courts have chosen to adopt the posi-
tion enunciated by the Second Circuit. In Madera v. Board of
Education of New York, l08 a junior high school student wished to
have an attorney attend a post-suspension conference. When this
request was denied, the Maderas obtained a temporary restraining
order prohibiting the school from holding any proceeding in which
the Maderas may be affected. 09 On appeal, the restraining order
was removed."l 0 The court determined the student had no right to
be represented at the guidance conference by an attorney."'
Many distinctions, however, can be drawn between Madera and
disciplinary proceedings of a university student. First, Madera
was decided prior to Goss, which requires students to have a hear-
ing prior to suspension."12 Second, the guidance conference in Ma-
dera was "[a]t the most . . . a very preliminary investigation, if
• . . an investigation at all."" 3 The guidance conference is usually
held after the suspension has taken place. Finally, the Madera
court expressly stated that "[w]hat due process may require
before a child is expelled from public school . . . is not before
US.' 1 1 4
us.""
University students today must be afforded a hearing before
they are expelled from school. That hearing will be adjudicatory
by nature to determine what type of conduct the student has dis-
played and whether that conduct is punishable. Since adjudicatory
hearings are more complex than guidance conferences, students
school student to transfer to another school than for a university student who has been
expelled for disciplinary reasons.
107. Goss, 419 U.S. at 583. The reason for this decision was because brief discipli-
nary suspensions, according to the Court, are almost countless. "To impose in each such
case even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm administrative facilities in
many places." Id.
It is important to note that the Court was referring to high schools and not universities.
108. 386 F.2d 778 (1967).
109. Id. at 780. Specifically, the Maderas were trying to stop the "Assistant Superin-
tendent's Hearing" already scheduled unless their legal counsel was permitted to be present
and to perform his tasks as an attorney. Id.
110. Id. at 789.
111. Id. at 784-89.
112. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
113. Madera, 386 F.2d at 785.
114. For these reasons, Madera should not be relied upon by proponents who wish to
keep university students from obtaining attorneys to represent them at disciplinary hear-
ings. Id. at 788 (emphasis added).
1988]
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need more help to protect the deprivation of important interests.115
Baker v. Hardway" is a case frequently cited with Madera to
deny students the right to obtain counsel at disciplinary hearings.
There, several state college students were to appear, prior to disci-
plinary proceedings, before one of several committees that were
investigating the students' conduct.11 The students could bring
with them as an advisor a faculty member, a fellow student, or
parents, 18 but not an attorney. These committee hearings were
similar to the guidance conferences in Madera, except that the
committee hearing occurred prior to any disciplinary action." 9
The court described the committee as having "none of the at-
tributes of a judicial body, since its only function was to gather
information and make recommendations which had no binding ef-
fect on the president and faculty or on the Board of Educa-
tion."' 20 As such, the court stated that the student might not have
the right to an attorney during a purely investigatory state.' 2'
However, the court noted that when there is a hearing which is
adjudicative in nature, a student may be entitled to the guidance
and assistance of counsel.' 22
This situation is analogous to criminal proceedings which use
the "critical stage" test established by the Supreme Court in
Coleman v. Alabama to determine if the presence of counsel is
mandated. 23 An accused must be represented by an attorney if he
is at a "critical stage" in the criminal process. The Supreme
Court has determined that a preliminary hearing, where initial
facts are presented, is a "critical stage" and therefore an attorney
must be provided to an accused.' 24 A disciplinary hearing can be
more crucial to a student than a preliminary hearing in a criminal
action. If an accused loses a preliminary hearing, none of his
rights or interests will be lost. He will simply advance to the next
115. Although Goss has overruled Madera in part, Madera still stands for the pro-
position that students are not allowed to be represented by attorneys at disciplinary
hearings.
116. 283 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.W.V. 1968).
117. Id. at 234. The students were being disciplined for putting on a demonstration
during the halftime of the homecoming football game. Approximately two hundred stu-
dents, the majority of whom were Negroes, demonstrated by marching back and forth on
the playing field, carrying placards and chanting themes denouncing the school's dean. The
demonstration was peaceful and non-violent. Id. at 231-32.
118. Id. at 234.
119. Id. at 236-37.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 238. This is similar to a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gouveia,
467 U.S. 180 (1984).
122. Id. at 238. The court used as a guideline the rules of procedure adopted by the
Commission on Civil Rights as discussed in Hannah v. Lorche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
123. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
124. Id.
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stage of the criminal process. If a disciplinary hearing goes
against the student, he could immediately lose his entire liberty
and property interests in his education. For this reason, a discipli-
nary hearing, like a preliminary hearing, is a "critical stage" for
the accused student. Accordingly, he should be afforded the op-
portunity to obtain counsel to represent him in the hearing.
The Supreme Court in Goss has stopped short of determining
whether students have the right to obtain counsel to represent
them at disciplinary proceedings.'25 The Court made it clear, how-
ever, that it was only addressing the issue of a short suspension.
"[W]e should. . . make it clear that we have addressed ourselves
solely to the short suspension, not exceeding 10 days. Longer sus-
pensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or
permanently, may require more formal procedures."' 6 The Court
was reluctant to deny high school students the right to obtain
counsel for disciplinary hearings when the suspension was only ten
days or less. This implies that when greater student interests are
at stake, significantly greater safeguards may be required, includ-
ing the right to attorney representation, at disciplinary hearings.
When Horowitz was decided three years later, the Supreme
Court still had not established the student's right to obtain an at-
torney.127 However, logic dictates that a university student, who
has a greater interest than high school students, should not be de-
nied the right to obtain counsel when his suspension could be
permanent.
Since the university system is more complex than high school or
elementary school systems, more due process should be afforded
the university student at a disciplinary hearing. In Goss, the Court
was reluctant to make a ruling on the right to obtain counsel be-
cause "brief disciplinary suspensions (in high school) are almost
countless." 128 The Court also stated that "high schools are vast
125. The Court said, "we stop short of construing the due process clause to require,
countrywide, that hearings in connection with short suspensions must afford the student the
opportunity to secure counsel . Goss, 419 U.S. at 583.
126. Id. at 584.
127. "The presence of attorneys or the imposition of rigid rules of cross-examination
at a hearing for a student . . . would serve no useful purpose, notwithstanding that the
dismissal in question may be of a permanent duration." Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 86 n.2.
128. Goss, 419 U.S. at 583; see, e.g., Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C.
1972), where the court cited statistics for the number of expulsions and suspensions from
1968 to November, 1971, in one school system:
Expulsions Suspensions
1968-69 37 1968-69 1,541
1969-70 24 1969-70 3,224
1970-71 32 1970-71 6,568
1971-72 48 1971-72 1,098
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and complex. ' 129 Universities, on the other hand, do not make it a
routine practice to suspend or expel students.
In his dissent in Horowitz, however, Mr. Justice Marshall com-
pared the magnitude of deprivation of a student of higher educa-
tion being expelled with the mere suspension of a high school stu-
dent. "As the court recognizes, the 'private interest' involved here
is a weighty one: 'the deprivation to which respondent was sub-jected-dismissal from a graduate medical school-was more se-
vere than the 10-day suspension to which the high school students
were subjected in Goss.' 130
V. CONCLUSION
By the time a student reaches college, he has put a substantial
amount of time, money, and effort into his education. This interest
in a student's education is one which should not be deprived with-
out due process of law. Due process in disciplinary actions should
include the right of the student to have his own attorney present
and participate in the disciplinary hearing.
As in criminal actions, the greater the interests that are being
deprived, the greater the amount of due process required. By the
time a student reaches the university level, he has a substantial
interest in his education. This is an interest that should not be
taken away without the student being afforded proper protection.
Disciplinary hearings are very similar to criminal hearings.
They require that charges be brought, witnesses testify, and cross-
examinations be conducted. A student should not be forced to re-
present himself at such a proceeding since he has so much to lose.
As Justice Douglas once stated: "Today's mounting bureaucracy
.. . promises to be suffocating and repressive unless it is'put into
the harness of procedural due process. One who need not explain
the response for his actions can operate beyond the law. One who
need not even hear a complaint from the citizen can turn sheer
power into an arbitrary force. Bureaucrats who can, without hear-
ings, ride hard on the people they are supposed to serve, are able
to dispense with the concept of equal protection and make their
ipse dixit the law."'1 31 At a disciplinary hearing for a university
student, fundamental fairness and due process require that the
student be allowed to obtain counsel to represent and participate
on behalf of the student at that hearing.
129. Goss, 419 U.S. at 580.
130. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 100 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
131. Spady v. Mount Vernon Housing Auth., 419 U.S. 985 (1974) (Douglas, J. dis-
senting from denial of cert.).
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